Photo: © DLuttwak / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 3.0
Edward Luttwak is an American strategist and consultant. He is the author of dozens of books, including the highly influential bestsellers Coup D’etat: A Practical Handbook, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, and The Grand Strategy of The Roman Empire.
What follows is a transcript of our conversation, which took place on July 28, 2025. The transcript has been edited for length and clarity.
[Note: The opinions expressed by the interviewee are their own and do not necessarily represent those of the interviewer.]
The Grand Strategy of the British Empire
CB: How would you describe the grand strategy of the British Empire?
EL: The British developed one method, and that method was to prevent anybody in Western Europe from becoming a suzerain over Western Europe. So, whether it was the French under Louis or the Germans—whoever it was who tried to establish suzerainty over Europe—the British would go and support the weak party in that war long enough so that the weak party was no longer the weak party, ready to change sides in case the weak party became the strong party.
This way, the powers of Europe had to spend their money on armies. Therefore, the British did not have to spend a lot to have naval superiority, and that was the technique. It was divide and rule, which is the permanent logic of these things throughout history. British foreign policy consisted in preventing the outbreak of any peace in Europe that would allow the consolidation of any supreme government in Europe. That was it.
So, as soon as somebody in Europe's provincial wars emerged as the top dog, the British were ready to oppose them. Now, the only time they didn’t do this was when Germany became the top dog in 1871, after defeating France. It did so largely because of the genius of the Prussian General Staff, who had this von Moltke—a very great military strategist—and the fortune that they also had a great political strategist in Bismarck.
Bismarck was besieged by German intellectuals, the so-called Flottenprofessoren—you know, the fleet professors—who said, “Well, Germany has the strongest army in Europe. We should do something with it.” Specifically, unify the German peoples, because the Italians had unified all the Italians in Italy, the French had all the French, etc. Only Germany had Germans scattered in parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, et cetera, and thought that “we, just as the Italians around the Italian government and the French around the French government, should put Germans under German government. And we have the strongest army in Europe, so let’s do it.”
And Bismarck said, “Yes, we have the strongest army in Europe. We have unified Germany itself. And this is as much power as Europe can take. Personally, I am willing to expand the borders of Germany in any direction—north, south, east, west—but just by two square meters, which is as much as you need to bury a German soldier. That’s as much as I will do.”
So he was a great strategist because he understood that Germany had reached its culminating point of success, also territorially. Today’s Germany, of course, is much smaller than the Germany Bismarck had put together, and which he refused to expand at all—knowing that if it did, everybody else would gang up against Germany, from the British to the Russians, and of course, the French.
The British understood that. They responded to it and were determined to avoid any war with Germany at all. And it just continued until Bismarck left, and then you had a new lot of people who did not realize their own intellectual mediocrity. They therefore, in 1914, said, “We are the strongest country in Europe. We have the most advanced industry, we have the most advanced culture, intellectual capital and so on.”
In 1914, if you went to Oxford, you could not study any science subject without first demonstrating competence in German, because all the good books were in German—chemistry, physics, the whole deal. And you could not study the classics, which were very prestigious in England—Latin and Greek—because all the great works were in German. The only subject you could study at Oxford University in 1914 without passing the German exam was English literature.
So Germany had it all: the world’s largest bank, the Deutsche Bank; the best universities; a fine army; and a rising navy. And what they didn’t have was anybody in the whole of Germany who had both strategic understanding, and influence and importance.
The professors in German universities, with very few exceptions, were the worst offenders. In fact, there was a thing called Flottenprofessoren—fleet professors—who were the people advocating, “We need a navy, we need a navy.” Intelligent people could see: we dominate world commerce; Deutsche Bank is the world’s largest bank; and all our global commerce is protected free of charge by the Royal Navy. So only a lunatic would try to challenge the Royal Navy, which is protecting our global commerce. And that’s exactly what they did.
The German intellectual failure to understand who they were, what they were, and what the world was—this is what brought down Western civilization to a degree from which it has never recovered. The civilization of 1914 has never recovered.
CB: Now, given their vast command of both human populations and natural resources, how did the British manage to forfeit their enormous power?
EL: Well, the British lost their vast global power because the British population was no longer willing to subject itself to the discipline of imperial power. That was the result not of the First World War, but of the Second World War, which terribly impoverished Britain.
The British machine tools were used to make weapons of war. At the end of the war, they were worn out, and there was only a feeble reconstruction after 1945. Then there was a catastrophe: the British joined in the Korean War rearmament. So instead of replacing the worn-out machine tools, they went back to arming themselves for Korea—which was completely unnecessary—because it was based on the wrong theory that the Korean War was the opening round of a non-nuclear war conducted by the Soviet Union.
So, there was the British rearmament. The Labour Party was in control, and it diverted British production away from replacing the worn-out tools of war and instead toward making weapons again. In fact, during the Korean War, they launched three separate strategic bomber programs—three different ones—with everything that goes with them. And this was while still maintaining military forces in 80 colonies around the world and a very large navy.
It was the attempt to maintain military power in this diminished post-war condition that impoverished British society and everything else, with lasting effects—until Maggie Thatcher. Only then was there some reconstruction. In other words, having won World War Two, the British didn’t “leave well enough alone.” They didn’t realize: We won the war—now we have to turn back to work.
The Key to Israeli Power
CB: There’s another smaller-sized country that wields disproportionate power relative to its size, and that country is, of course, Israel, in whose army you served.
EL: Well, I was only a war volunteer. I volunteered in ’67 and then went back in ’73, and so on. I was a war volunteer—they gave me a gun and allowed me to have a good time. But I was never formally inducted into the armed forces, although I did work as a contractor later on.
Israel’s power does not arise from coal mines, steel mills, or factories. It arises from an extremely audacious laboratory and a mass military. The Israeli formula for military power is universal conscription of men and women. The ultra-religious—10% to 12% of the population—don’t serve, although that will probably change very shortly. Everybody else serves, and they serve for a long time: three years of compulsory military service, which is far more than other countries. The Finns do four months, the Swedes a year, and so forth—Israel does three years.
And instead of impoverishing society, this is what enriches society, because the Israeli armed forces are a kind of complementary educational institution. If you join the armed forces and you don’t know how to read and write, they teach you to read and write—which is significant for parts of the population. There are many Bedouins, all the Druze, and people from the Caucasus. If you don’t know how to use a computer, they give you a computer and teach you how to use it. In other words, it’s an educational institution.
Originally, it taught Hebrew, because people came from all over the world. It taught reading and writing, and then taught all kinds of other technologies and techniques. Now, there are quite a few separate battalions, brigades, and organizations where people are conscripted for three years, and quite a few sign up for five or even seven years.
When they finish, they may have a university degree, but more importantly, they have highly valuable training and skills. I have a relative who signed up for a total of seven years when he was called up for three. He happened to go to the base of this unit with three other boys. When they graduated seven years later, they set up a company, which they sold for $200 million, then another company, then another—and now they’re in the billion-dollar category. This is an extreme case.
A lot of others simply learn to read and write, to use a laptop, to do things. If you operate the armed forces as an explicitly educational institution that teaches not just academic knowledge but a variety of skills, you can both spend a lot on defense and get a lot out of it. This is the Israeli secret and formula. But you do need the willingness to serve. If you could objectively display the life track of these Israelis who went into the army, everyone would want to do the same for career reasons. But people don’t think in those terms.
CB: What are the core strategic assets of Israel? And how does Israel use these to project power?
EL: What the military system does is generate power with very little. The United States gives Israel credits—loans—to buy aircraft like the F-35. Now, the heart of the F-35 is the so-called helmet-mounted display, which controls all the sensors outside the airplane and all these other systems—that was actually developed in Israel. Israeli technology is in the F-35 aircraft.
The Israelis didn’t do anything about the stealth, but they did a lot of the other systems. When you supply an F-35 to a country that can afford the very high cost, they can learn how to use it. But what the Israelis do with the F-35 is, first of all, they upgrade it. The electronics of the Israeli F-35 are different and more advanced than the U.S. F-35. Nothing prevents the U.S. Air Force from adopting the same technology.
It’s the same with the F-15, a purely American aircraft. The Israelis didn’t contribute to its systems as they did with the F-35, but they wanted to use the fighter as a bomber. They invented conformal fuel tanks—not under-wing fuel tanks, which compete with bombs, but conformal tanks mounted on the sides. These impose much less of an aerodynamic penalty and give the aircraft a much longer range.
During the recent war, Israel operated in Iran—over 1,000 kilometers away—conducting strategic bombing without a single strategic bomber, because its F-15 fighters had strategic range. The United States sold the same F-15s, with Israeli tanks, to the Saudis and also to the U.S. Air Force.
So yes, Israel receives a lot of U.S. military aid, but there are two big differences from all the other countries lining up for American money and weapons. First, Israelis have never wanted or accepted U.S. troops to fight in their wars. They don’t crave them; they don’t want them. Even during the Gulf War, when the U.S. sent Patriot batteries with American crews, the Israelis quickly learned how to operate them and pushed the Americans out within a week.
By contrast, our other allies—including new ones like Romania and Poland—beg for U.S. troops. They say: “Give us money, yes. Give us weapons, yes. But most importantly, give us U.S. troops.” Israelis never want U.S. troops.
Second, the Israelis contribute a lot of technology. Even some of the first drones the U.S. ever had were purchased from Israel. Later, the U.S. lured the chief drone engineer from the leading Israeli company—he set up the big firm that made all the U.S. Predator drones. The Predator drone is the work of an Israeli engineer from that Israeli company.
Israel is different from all other recipients because they don’t want U.S. forces stationed there, and they contribute technology. In the past, the British did this too; now Israel is alone in contributing technology. For example, the U.S. M1 tank has a device that intercepts anti-tank missiles, called Trophy.
When Ukrainians used German Leopard tanks in their offensive, they lost all of them in short order—because they didn’t have Trophy. The U.S. M1s in the same position wouldn’t have lost a single one.
Finally, there’s intelligence sharing. Israeli intelligence has perhaps 1/30 of the U.S. intelligence budget, but it generates a great deal of intelligence of all sorts. They have their own radar satellites—not just photographic ones. And, unlike the CIA, which in reality has no field capability, the Israelis have operatives who can, for example, move to Tehran, ride a motorcycle past an Iranian nuclear scientist as he leaves his house, attach a limpet mine to his car, and disappear into traffic. The CIA has this in movies, but not in reality, and hasn’t for 50 or 60 years.
On Arab Military Ineffectiveness
CB: Why are modern Arab militaries often ineffective? I’m thinking of when Gaddafi invaded Chad, among many other examples.
EL: Yes, in the 1980’s Gaddafi’s army, with tanks, descends upon Chad and runs into the French Foreign Legion and some Chadian units. The Chadians are equipped with Toyota pickup trucks with the French Apilas anti-tank missile. Yes—Chad is a Muslim country.
The real problem is not just in Arab countries—it’s Muslim countries. Jihad is embedded in Islam, which makes people bellicose. But there are other things in Islam, one of them being a very authoritarian culture. This means that all Arab military operations resemble the Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War.
There was this extremely aristocratic, very wealthy British cavalry commander. A young lieutenant from headquarters came and said “Charge,” and pointed with his hand where to charge. The commander misread the instructions and was charging right into the Russian artillery—and nobody contradicted him. People realized they were racing their horses toward the Russian guns, but his deputies didn’t contradict him. That’s the kind of top-down mentality we’re talking about.
Ayatollah Khamenei commented, when he re-emerged from hiding after fighting with Israel, that he congratulated the people of Iran for their great victory. He was preventing Iranians from doing what you normally do when you’ve just been defeated by a small country far away—a country without a single strategic bomber—flying freely over your territory. Iranian pilots, mindful of their wives and children, simply did not take off—therefore staying safe.
To win a war, you need command and control. You need discipline. If somebody issues orders, you have to follow them—but the person issuing orders must be attentive to circumstances and to anyone who says, “Don’t charge down that valley—that’s where the Russian artillery is. He meant for you to charge in the other valley to get behind the guns.” They don’t do that. An authoritarian religion makes for terrible conduct in war.
The End of Netanyahu?
CB: What would the Middle East look like if Netanyahu achieved all of his core strategic objectives?
EL: He did. He did achieve them. And as soon as the war is over, he will leave—never to appear again—because after every Israeli war, short or long, there is a commission of inquiry.
The commission of inquiry will find him responsible without any particular accusations, simply because October 7 was a great failure. He was the Prime Minister, and therefore he has ministerial responsibility. That is how the Zionist heroine Golda Meir was forced out after the ’73 war.
There was a commission, and these commissions are always assembled from the very top people in society. Their conclusions are never disputed, except maybe on technicalities. Golda Meir, the fearless fighter, was Prime Minister when the October War started as a surprise because of an intelligence failure.
This happened again on October 7, so Netanyahu’s career will end very soon. Once the fighting ends, the commission will find that he has ministerial responsibility—even if he has no personal responsibility. He was Prime Minister, therefore he has ministerial responsibility. Other organizations and individuals will be subject to more detailed scrutiny.
The Russia-China-Iran Axis
CB: What role does Iran play in Russian and Chinese strategies at the moment?
EL: China and Israel, and Russia and Israel, have diplomatic relations. Red Wings airline flies Tel Aviv to Moscow every morning, even while other airlines don’t. Putin himself has always been very much a friend of the Jews—specifically Jews—since his earliest days.
I know that because I met him in 1990, when he was merely an employee of the Leningrad municipality. We spoke German—my Russian is terrible. I was negotiating with the mayor of Leningrad, who was a law professor and the first person to be elected to any position in the Soviet Union as it was declining. Putin was responsible for foreign affairs for the city of Leningrad.
He spoke very good German, and we negotiated in German on behalf of my clients. He told me his life story. He grew up in a Jewish family—not that he was Jewish himself—but in those days Russian families had to share apartments. They had to share the kitchen and bathroom, and each family would have one or perhaps two rooms. In Leningrad, with all these old imperial buildings, there were more rooms, but they still had to share.
He grew up with a Jewish family, and his father and mother were, let’s say, very busy with their work—or whatever it was—so he grew up with them. He happens to be philosemitic, and always has been. His best friends are the Rotenberg brothers, from whom he learned judo. They’re also Jewish.
Leningrad was, in fact, a very Jewish city, and Putin benefited enormously from his personal relationships with his Jewish friends—the Rotenbergs and others—and with the early oligarchs. This is important.
As for the Chinese, they wouldn’t be caught dead fighting for Iran against Israel. They’re not idiots. To the Chinese, Iranians are just another lot of Muslim fanatics. They have been willing to sell them rocket fuel and all kinds of stuff. But the idea that they would fight the Americans for them—the Russians will never do that, and the Chinese certainly won’t.
CB: How strong is China at the moment?
EL: Well, the Chinese have a big army, navy, and air force—and a big country. But nobody in history has ever fought a war with an army manned entirely by single children, whose deaths would mean the extinction of a family name.
The Chinese have never fought under those circumstances. If a war involving China had a land element—say, on the Indian border, where there are two armies facing each other—there are about 80,000 Chinese and about 80,000 Indians in Ladakh.
Judging by what happened when four Chinese soldiers died in 2020—they kept it secret for eight months while they prepared things like memorial halls, moved the families into beautiful houses, and ran a full-scale media campaign—when they finally announced the deaths, they had created an entire propaganda effort to persuade people it was right and justifiable.
The Indians had thirty dead, and they were simply given to their families, who buried them in different parts of India.
The way the Chinese handled four losses makes me wonder how they would handle 4,000. Whoever fights the Chinese needs to kill troops, not sink ships. The objective is the crews, not the vessels. They’ve got lots of ships, and we—meaning the U.S.—don’t, because we have a Naval Sea Systems Command that is essentially a perfectionist cult.
They turn every naval project into an endless process. You go in and say, “Can you make me a landing craft for 100 Marines?” They call it the light landing ship and even offer little pictures. Then they withdraw it and come back with a medium landing ship, which won’t be ready this year but will take seven years—and cost ten times what the original would have.
So we have crippling problems with our own armed forces, such as turning every ship into a perfectionist pursuit as the years pass and the costs multiply.
CB: How strong is Russia?
EL: The strength of Russia is that, even under extreme incompetence of all kinds, nobody even thinks of marching to Moscow and imposing control. Nobody thinks of marching to Moscow. Whereas the Russians could march on Kiev any day they wanted. The reason they don’t march on Kiev is because they don’t want to confront Europe with the enormity of its passivity and force the Europeans to really mobilize. If they take Kiev, the Europeans will mobilize.
Europe: The Superpower That Wasn’t
CB: I spend a lot of time in Poland, Finland, Romania. How would you describe the current political spectrum in Europe? I get the sense that there is great unease in the populace, great dissatisfaction with the Brussels leadership.
EL: Yeah. In other words, the elites wanted to transfer power to Brussels, and it was very rewarding for many of them. Instead of having to deal with petty, local realities, they’re in Brussels—it’s international, you’re part of something, the European Union, which people consider equivalent to the United States in order of magnitude. And why be a provincial politician when you can be a Eurocrat? So there’s been that.
As for the European Union, it has disappointed expectations because it never established its own standards and values as dominant, and therefore it accommodates local European politicians and bureaucracies in the worst way. Europe doesn’t bring reform or improvement.
You mentioned Romania. Romanian politics are afflicted by what you might call endemic corruption. The Romanians are just like the Italians—they’re both endemically corrupt. They also have good food, pretty women, and life in Bucharest is far superior to life in studiously non-corrupt Scandinavia. To get a decent meal in Scandinavia is almost impossible. In Romania, the food is good and the wine is good.